Abstract. In cooperative systems many of the obligations, prohibitions and permissions that govern the behaviour of the system exist as a result of communication with users and/or other systems. In this paper we will discuss the role of illocutionary logic and deontic logic in modelling these communication processes and the resulting norms. The combination of illocutionary and deontic logic can be used to reason about communication structures. It is also possible to model the authorization relations, on the basis of which orders and requests can be made, and the delegation of these authoritizations in this logic.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest in cooperative systems or cooperating agents(see e.g. Po93] ). However, little has been said about how these cooperating agents in uence each other's behaviour. Each agent has certain capabilities, actions that it can perform. These actions can be material, such as opening a window, or communicative, such as providing some piece of information. Each agent also has an agenda containing the actions to be performed by the agent, instantly or at some designated time. In a normative system this agenda consists of the obligations of the agent. We assume that the agenda is not xed but can be manipulated by the agent. The agent can add new obligations to the agenda (typically done on the request of another agent). He can also remove actions by performing them or by violating the obligation. In the latter case he usually is obliged to perform some new action that compensates for the violation. The description of the obligations and the manipulation of the obligations has been the subject of research in normative systems and deontic logic (see e.g. MW93] ). The interaction between agents can most easily be seen in the cases where a particular service is rendered from one agent to the other. A (simple) example of such a service is illustrated in the following picture.
In general we can distinguish three phases of communication. The rst phase is the negotiation about the terms of the contract. In this phase authorizations can be established on the basis of which some actions can be performed in the following phases. In the above gure this corresponds to the requesting and sending of a quotation. Here, sending a quotation implies authorizing the customer to order some products on some speci ed conditions. The second phase consists of the acceptance of the contract. I.e. the authorizations and obligations that follow from the contract. In the above example this is included in the order which implies an acceptance of the quotation. The last phase is the ful lment of the contract. I.e. following a protocol according to the terms agreed upon in the contract. In the example this corresponds to the actual order, delivery and payment sequence. In this paper we will show that the communication processes described above (including the resulting norms) can be modelled using illocutionary logic and deontic logic. Illocutionary logic SV85] is a logical formalisation of the theory of speech acts Se69] and is used to formally describe the communication structure itself. A rst attempt to model communication using speech acts is made in the method SAMPO LL86] , but this does not include the deontic aspects. In Lee88], Lee presents a language and modelling technique for deontic rules, but these model procedures rather than communication structures.
The fundamental reason for the use of deontic concepts is that coordination of behaviour always requires some form of mutual commitment. If an agent does not execute an action, he has committed himself to, this causes a violation of the contract. Because the action should be executed in the future, it cannot be guaranteed, so the interpretation "it will happen in all future courses of events" is too strong, but the interpretation "it will happen in some course of events" is too weak. Interpreting the formula " is obligatory" as: 'not doing violates a commitment", we get a more precise meaning of what it is that something is on an agent's agenda.
In the next section we present a logical formalismthat incorporates the speech acts into the dynamic deontic logic described in Me88]. This language can be used to model the norms that result from the communications between agents in a normative system. The combination of illocutionary logic and deontic logic is used to build communication protocols or contracts, that de ne the subsequent steps in the communication and how these steps are related. I.e. which are the allowed reactions to a certain action. E.g. After a product has been delivered the reaction should be a payment of the order. In section 3, a framework for describing contracts is presented on the basis of the logic de ned in section 2. Section 4 gives some conclusions and directions for future research.
Logical foundations for modelling communication
In this section we will present the logical foundation on the basis of which the communication processes between agents can be modelled. The logical language is based on the dynamic deontic logic described in Me88], which is extended to include speech acts as formalized in illocutionary logic.
The language
We start with a language based on the Dynamic Deontic Logic Language given in Me88]. We will only give a short overview.
We start by de ning a language of parameterized actions L act
De nition 2.1 The language L act of actions is given by the following BNF: :: ? aj 1 2 j 1 & 2 j janyjfail The a stands for the atomic actions in the system, like "order(i,j,p)", which states that agent i orders p from agent j. The rst parameter indicates the subject of the action. The meaning of 1 2 is a choice between 1 and 2 . 1 & 2 stands for the parallel execution of 1 and 2 . The expression stands for the non-performance of the action . The any action is a universal or "don't care which" action. Finally the fail action is the action that always fails (deadlock).
This action does not lead to a next state.
The language L act can be used to describe actions within dynamic deontic logic. The language of dynamic deontic logic (L dd ) is given in the following de nition.
De nition 2.2 The language L dd of dynamic deontic logic is given by the following BNF:
The intuitive meaning of ] is that after the execution of , necessarily holds. The meaning of B(i; ) is that agent i believes . I(i; ) means that agent I intends to perform and I(i; ) means that agent i intends to bring about. Due to a lack of space we did not include temporal aspects in the logical language. One way to do this in a simple way is described in WMW89].
The deontic operators are de ned by the following abbreviations (cf. Me88, WMW89]):
Where V iolation ij are special predicates indicating the violation of an agreement between i and j. So, the agent i is obliged to agent j to perform the action (i) if not doing (i) by i leads to a violation of i with respect to j, i is forbidden to do (i) by j if doing (i) leads to a violation of i with respect to j. i is permitted to do (i) by j if i is not forbidden to do (i) by j.
In order to model the communication between agents in a normative system the language L dd has to be extended to incorporate speech acts as described in illocutionary logic. Before we introduce the speech acts, rst we introduce two special relations involving agents. One relation implements a power relation between two agents and the other one implements an authorization of an agent to perform some action. The power relation is the most primitive relation of the two. There exists a power relation between the agent i and the agent j with respect to action , if i has the power to order j to perform the action . For instance, the boss can order his secretary to type a letter for him. Note that he might not have the power to order his secretary to make co ee for him! We assume that the power relation is persistent and is only changed in special occasions, like when a manager is appointed. The power relation can also be de ned with respect to a proposition. This means so much as that i has the power to convince j of the truth of . For instance, a student will (usually) consider the statements of a teacher to be true. The power relation de nes a partial ordering on the class of agents for every action . This ordering is re exive (self-power) and transitive but not necessarily total.
Notation: if i has power over j with respect to we write: j < i. If i has power over j with respect to the truth of we write j < i.
The second relation is the authorization relation. This relation can be established for a certain time with mutual agreement (under certain restrictions). For instance, I can agree that a company can order me to pay a certain amount of money after they delivered a product. This relation ends after I pay the money. The authorization relation is modelled using a special predicate.
Notation: if i is authorized to do we write: auth(i, ).
We will now continue by extending the language of actions to include the speech acts. A speech act is formalised as an illocutionary point (indicating the goal of the speech act) with three parameters: the Speaker, the Addressee, and the content. We distinguish the following basic speech acts (based upon SV85, Aus62]):
De nition 2.4 DIR(i,j, ) { i does a request to j for COM(i,j, ) { i commits himself to j to do ASS(i,j, ) { i asserts to j proposition DECL(i,j, ) { i declares and informs j that holds from now on From these basic speech acts we can construct other basic speech acts by e.g. using the logical negation of actions.
De nition 2.5 FOR(i,j, ) = DIR(i,j, ) { i forbids j to do PER(i,j, ) = DECL(i,j,P j;i ( (j)) { i permits j to do There might be some dispute over the question whether the declarative DECL has an Addressee parameter, since if it succeeds, the e ect will be a change of the world and not of the knowledge of the Addressee only. Depending on the preparatory conditions, it is not necessary that there is an Addressee at all. However, in general it makes little sense to do a declarative speech act and not inform anybody. Hence the Addressee should be understood here as the agent (or set of agents) that is informed.
Declaratives can only be used for speci c institutionalized speech acts, so the propositional content is usually rather restricted. In practice, a limited number of speci c declaratives will be distinguished, such as the "authorization" action that we will introduce in section 2.2.
Speech acts can be grounded in three di erent ways: charity, power and authorization. (See also DW92] for a similar distinction as an improvement to the completely power based CSCW tool Coordinator ( FGHW88])). For instance, a directive (DIR) can be made on the basis of charity, which means it is a request, or on the basis of a power relation or authorization (in which cases it is an order). Hence for each basic speech act we distinguish three variants, indicated by a subscript c,p or a. So, DIR a stands for an authorized request, whereas DIR p stands for an order based on power. Similarly for assertives and declaratives. For commissives, the distinction seems to be not very relevant and we ignore it here. Likewise, when the distinction of the powerbase of a speech act is not important, we will ignore the subscript.
The language of all acts is now de ned in two steps. First we de ne the set of all speech acts L Sact . 
The speech acts of L Sact as de ned above do not contain all elements of speech acts that are identi ed in illocutionary logic. The propositional content conditions are not modelled at this moment. They can be modelled through a re nement of the language L Sact which renders only those speech acts syntactically correct that comply to the propositional content conditions. In an Information System environment, the propositional content conditions are contained in the data model.
The preparatory conditions ( ) and the intended e ects ( ) of a speech act ( ) can be modelled through the following schema:
Which means that if is true then will hold after has been performed. The intended e ects of the speech acts are described by means of deontic and epistemic operators, while the preparatory conditions refer to either the authorization relation or the power relation. We have the following general preparatory conditions and intended e ects for the basic speech acts. Of course, for speech acts mentioning speci c actions there might be more conditions and e ects. The last of the above properties expresses the fact that a person can be authorized to assert some facts. If this person asserts such a fact the e ect is that the Addressee(s) will believe that fact (which is not the same as making the fact true, which happens with a declaration!).
The axioms describe the e ects of power and authorization speech acts, but not of those based on charity. This is correct, although we might add some politeness rules that say that a message is always replied. For example, a request based on charity would be replied by either a commissive or an assertion of the e ect that the agent does not commit himself: DIR c (i,j, )] O ji (COM(j; i; ) ASS(j; i; :O ji ( ))))
In a formal context we assume that an agent is always sincere and thus we have:
Axiom 2.9 DIR(i,j, )] I(i, ) { any DIR speech acts expresses that i intends to happen DECL(i,j, )] I(i, ) { any DECL speech acts expresses that i intends to bring about (by the speech act) ASS(i,j, )] B(i, ) { any ASS speech act expresses that i believes
So the e ect of a DIR c is at least that the agent knows about the subjects intention, and this can trigger him to commit himself.
The dynamics of authorization
If the subject is not authorized, it can not issue a DIR a speech act sucessfully. In that case, it can try to attain an authorization rst. This can be done by means of a DIR c (i,j,DECL(j,i,auth(i,DIR(..)))) , that is, a request for authorization of the other party. If the other party complies to the request, that is, grants the authorization, the subject gets authorized from that time on. This example shows that the system should not only formalize authorized behavior itself, but also the creation of authorizations, and, for that matter, the deletion. The crux of the formalization is that authorizations can only be made and retracted by an act of the other party. Because the establishment of authorizations is an important and frequently occurring speech act we introduce the following notation:
AUT(i,j, ) == DECL a (i,j,auth(j, )) So, AUT(i,j, ) means that i gives authorization to j to do . Of course, this speech act is only successful if i is authorized to give this authorization. For that reason, we have to presuppose the following axiom: Axiom 2.10 1. auth(i,AUT(i,j,DIR a (j,i, (i)))) 2. auth(i,AUT(i,j,ASS a (j,i,p))) that says that each agent is authorized to authorize other parties as far as actions and beliefs of the agent himself are concerned. This is irrespective of whether the granting of authorizations is forbidden by for example a higher power. If that would be the case, the authorization would still be successful, although the agent might be punished for it.
The ability to retract an authorization should be left to the subject of the authorization. If i has granted j an authorization, it is only j who can retract the authorization. For this purpose, we introduce a new declarative RTR: RTR(i,j, ) == DECL a (i,j,:auth(i, )) The preparatory condition of RTR is that the authorization does exist. By axiom, every agent is authorized to retract authorizations given to him. If an agent has rst granted an authorization, and then wants to retract it, he must ask the other party to do so. Of course, the agents may have made appointments. For example, the agent who grants the authorization may ensure himself of the authorization to request the retracting. The e ect is that he can have the authorization retracted whenever he wants.
"Ordering" in logic
In this section we will show how the example given in section 1, about ordering products, can be formally described in the logic developed sofar. Each of the arrows from gure 1 (i.e. each of the messages between the customer and the company) is modelled with a logical formula. The whole contract including the request for quotation can be modelled by the following formulas:
After a request for a quotation (i.e. a directive based on charity) the company is obliged to give the quotation or send a refusal. Here we assume some business rule that such a request is always answered. 2. give-quotation(j,i,g,p)] auth(i,DIR a (i,j,deliver(j,i,g,p)))
If a company gives a quotation for a certain price (p) the client is authorized to order the product (g) for that price.
3. auth(i,DIR a (i,j,deliver(j,i,g,p))) ! DIR a (i,j,deliver(j,i,g,p))](O ji (deliver(j,i,g,p))^ deliver(j,i,g,p)]auth(j,DIR a (j,i,pay(i,j,p)))) If a customer is authorized to order a product for a certain price (i.e. a quotation has been given for that price) then the company is obliged to deliver the product after the customer has ordered it. (This follows directly from the axioms 2.8.) But after delivery of the product, the company is authorized to order the customer to pay for it.
4. O ji (deliver(j,i,g,p)) ! deliver(j,i,g,p)]:auth(i,DIR a (i,j,deliver(j,i,g,p)))
If a company has to deliver a product and actually does it, the customer is no longer authorized to request delivery of the product. (One might omit this formula or replace it with a formula that limits the validity of the quotation to a period of time).
5. auth(j,DIR a (j,i,pay(i,j,p))) ! DIR a (j,i,pay(i,j,p))]O ij (pay(i,j,p))
If an order has been delivered (and authority acquired to request payment) a request for payment induces an obligation for the customer to pay. (This follows directly from the axioms 2.8.)
6. O ij (pay(i,j,p)) ! pay(i,j,p)]:auth(j,DIR a (j,i,pay(i,j,p))) Finally, after the customer has paid, the company cannot request another payment again. Although the above formulas describe the exchange between the customer and the company exact and complete, they are not very readable. In the next section we will show a language that is based on the logic introduced in this section, but has a more readable syntax and structures the (speech) acts to form transactions and services.
Contracts and communication protocols
In this section we will give an overview of the formal speci cation language CoLa (Communication Language), which is based on the logic described in section 2 and on the language presented in We93]. Due to space limitations, this overview will not be extensive neither complete, but will be given by illustrating how the example from section 1 can be modelled in this language.
The protocols that are speci ed in CoLa are independent from the applications, but in contrast to traditional communication protocols, they capture the complete communication logic, not just a set or ordered set of messages. The contracts speci ed in CoLa are managed by a Contract Manager, which is a process responsible for the proper dealing with the communication, including (a) the transaction management, including compensation; (b) the set-up of new contracts, and adaptation of active ones. It follows that these aspects therefore do not have to be speci ed in the contracts themselves. For instance, we do not have to specify in the contract what happens if a message does not arrive through some hardware failure. Handling this kind of communication problems is typically a task for the Contract Manager and can be speci ed (generically) in that place. We will not consider the Contract Manager in this paper, but assume it to be present.
The contracts as speci ed in CoLa are units of cooperation between two or more agents, and have a three-level organization: messages, transactions and services. Messages are de ned using primitives such as request,assert, and authorize. These message types have pre-de ned semantics as described in section 2, in terms of obligations and authorizations. The agents that are involved in the contract and the messages that each of them uses as explicit speech act during the execution of the contract are speci ed at the start of the contract. The messages that are not de ned here are implemented as implicit speech acts executed through some other action. For instance, the commitment of the company to deliver a product in this contract is not modelled as an explicit speech act. It is only implicit through the actual delivery of the product. Note that this is a choice made for this contract indicating that in this case there is no need to send a message indicating that the company commits itself to deliver the product. For our example the explicit speech acts are as follows: The messages that are speci ed here correspond to the speech acts that are used in the contract (either explicitly or implicitly). For instance, "request quotation" is de ned as a request c (corresponding to DIR c in the logic), which is de ned local within the transaction "quotation". We do not specify all actions that are used in the contract, but only the speech acts. So, the actions deliver and pay are not speci ed at this place! Messages that are aimed at the establishing (or adapting) a certain deontic statement (that is, a conjunction of obligations and authorizations) are grouped together in transactions. A typical example of a transaction is a request of the client followed by a commit, or refuse, of the server. For each transaction, there is a successful termination, indicated by the goal of the transaction, and nonsuccessful terminations. In the example we have the following transactions: TRANSACTIONS transaction quotation isa get_authorization(order(Partno, Quantity, Price)); transaction get_authorization(Alfa:action) messages request_c(auth(Alfa)); authorize(Alfa), refuse(authorize(Alfa)); goal authorize(Alfa) end-transaction;
